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A CONSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE OF CARNIVORE,
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT'S NEWEST
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE STRATEGY
The disciplinary institutions secreted a machinery of control that
functioned like a microscope of conduct .... How was one to
subdivide the gaze in these observation machines? How was
one to establish a network of communications between them?.
... The perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible
for a single gaze to see everything constantly. A central point
would be both the source of light illuminating everything, and a
locus of convergence for everything that must be known: a
perfect eye that nothing would escape and a centre towards
which all gazes would be turned.
-Michel Foucault'
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the last two years, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI")
has implemented a surveillance tool called Carnivore to investigate people
who may be using the internet 2 to commit crimes.3 Clearly, a tool like
Carnivore promotes better law enforcement because it gives the FBI access
to an electronic medium in which criminals facilitate and engage in illegal
conduct.4 The internet is the newest context for crime5 and continues to
1. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 173 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books ed. 1979) (1977).
2. Although the word "Internet" is traditionally capitalized, the central point of this
Comment is that legislators and courts need to demystify the internet. See discussion infra Part
IV. Thus, this Comment will not hereinafter capitalize "internet."
3. Digital Privacy and the FBI's Carnivore Internet Surveillance Program: Hearing Before
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr,
Assistant Dir., FBI) [hereinafter Digital Privacy].
4. President's Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
The Electronic Frontier: The Challenge of Unlawful Conduct Involving the Use of the Internet, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm (March 2000) (discussed in the
Executive Summary) [hereinafter President's Working Group].
5. Id.
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challenge judges, legislators and law enforcement agencies that attempt to
apply traditional legal standards to a digital dimension.6 While the
government attempts to catch internet criminals by experimenting with a
gamut of internet surveillance strategies, 7 non-criminal internet users are
left clutching the Fourth Amendment8 to balance their right to privacy
against law enforcement's need to access the internet for crime prevention. 9
According to the FBI, Carnivore maximizes law enforcement capabilities
while adhering to current federal surveillance laws.10  Alternately,
computer privacy advocates argue that Carnivore's broad search
capabilities violate current federal surveillance laws, compromising the
internet user's Fourth Amendment right to privacy."
In response to criticism that Carnivore violates internet privacy, 12 the
United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") conducted the only official
examination of Carnivore by briefly suspending the program for a strictly
technical review. 13 The DOJ confirmed that Carnivore successfully met the
FBI's claims of technical ability. 14  With a stamp of approval, the DOJ
concluded its federal inquiry into Carnivore without conducting any
constitutional review. Moreover, this failure to constitutionally assess
Carnivore signifies the FBI's official initiation into boundless internet
surveillance.
6. See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 169 (3d Cir. 2000) (the court described the internet as
"fundamentally and profoundly anti-spatial. You cannot say where it is or describe its memorable
shape and proportions or tell a stranger how to get there. But you can find things in it without
knowing where they are. The [Internet] is ambient-nowhere in particular and everywhere at
once.") (citing Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 956 (Ariz. 1998)).
7. Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (oral statement of Martha Stansell-Gamm, Chief, Computer
Crimes, U.S. Dep't of Justice). Recently disclosed federal surveillance technologies include
Omnivore, Network Intrusion Defense System ("NIDS") and SNIFFY. Id. Echelon is another
surveillance program that attracts international attention despite the U.S. government shadowing
its existence. See Steve Kettmann, U.S. Eyes Europe's Echelon Probe, WIRED, July 6, 2000, at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,3741 1,00.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2001).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. See ACLU Action Alert, Urge Congress to Stop the FBIs Use of Privacy-Invading
Software, at http://www.aclu.org/action/camivore 107.html (last modified Nov. 6, 2000).
10. See discussion infra Part III.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.
12. Institute's Report on Carnivore Causes Uproar Among Critics, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
LITIG. REP., Dec. 11, 2000, at 8.
13. See David McGuire, DOJ Appoints Experts To Dissect Carnivore, NEWSBYTES, at
http://www.newsbytes.com/news/00/155813.html (Sept. 27, 2000).
14. ILL. INST. OF TECH. RESEARCH INST., Independent Technical Review of Carnivore
System Final Report, at vii, available at http://www.usdoj.gov:80/jmd/publications/carniv
final.pdf (Dec. 8, 2000) (contracted by U.S. Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter ILL. INST. OF TECH.].
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The DOJ intended its technical review to address public concern that
Carnivore violates internet privacy. 15 However, Carnivore's capacity to
perform exactly as the FBI claims only magnifies public concern.16
Capable of exposing nearly all internet communications, only federal
statutes limit Carnivore. 17  Unfortunately, because the government
principally tailored current surveillance statutes to regulate telephones, the
surveillance statutes fail to adequately protect the internet user's Fourth
Amendment right to privacy.' 
8
Upon completion of the DOJ review, the courts and legislators now
face two options for controlling Carnivore. First, they can stand by current
federal statutes, ignoring the fact that the internet transmits more personal
information than previous technology. Second, they can accept the more
difficult challenge of creating new internet-specific surveillance laws that
ensure less encroachment on Fourth Amendment privacy. New
technologies open new avenues of abuse, both by criminals and the
government.19 This Comment acknowledges that law enforcement has a
legitimate place on the internet. However, replacing technologically
insufficient surveillance laws with internet-specific surveillance laws is
necessary to prohibit law enforcement from exploiting technology and
infringing on individual rights to privacy.
Part II of this Comment begins with a brief history of how the courts
and legislators balance law enforcement's duty to protect the public from
crime against society's expectations for Fourth Amendment privacy. Part
III illustrates the FBI's design of Carnivore's protocol with current
surveillance laws in mind. Part IV criticizes Carnivore as an
unconstitutional means of electronic surveillance. This section also
proposes new internet-specific legislative strategies to protect users' Fourth
Amendment right to privacy. Finally, Part V concludes with suggestions
for a future course of action to tame Carnivore.
15. Institute's Report on Carnivore Causes Uproar Among Critics, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
LITIG. REP., Dec. 11, 2000, at 8.
16. See id.
17. See discussion infra Part III.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.
19. See discussion infra Part II.
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II. JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGISLATION REGULATING ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE
A. Early Foundation of Modern Surveillance Regulation: From the
Supreme Court to Congress
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects.",20  It also guards against unreasonable searches, declaring that
courts may issue warrants only after law enforcement establishes probable
cause. 2  In 1928, the Supreme Court addressed the delicate balance
between the Fourth Amendment's assurance of privacy and law
enforcement's desire to monitor criminal suspects by phone tapping.22 In
Olmstead v. United States,23 the Court held that federal law enforcement
can forego the warrant requirement when tapping a suspect's phone line to
monitor a conversation.24 The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment
only guards against the government's physical trespass on a
constitutionally protected area, such as the subject's home, and not against
access to an outside phone line.25
Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead,26 however, established the
Court's reasoning in subsequent decisions expanding the Fourth
Amendment's reach.27 Brandeis boldly posited that unchecked government
abuse of surveillance technologies is unconstitutional espionage.28 He
accurately predicted the modem reality of interet surveillance when he
envisioned, "the Government, without removing papers from secret
drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Id.
22. See Jonathan P. Cody, Comment, Protecting Privacy over the Internet: Has the Time
Come To Abandon Self-Regulation?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1183, 1194 (1999).
23. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
24. See id. at 466.
25. See id. In deciding whether the telephone owner intended to project his voice outside of
his home by using the telephone, the Court found "the wires beyond his house and messages
while passing over them are not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
26. Id. at 471-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
27. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding the Court's decisions
eroded the opinion in Olmstead so that the trespass doctrine, or the idea that the Fourth
Amendment only protects from the government's physical invasion or trespass of a home, no
longer controlled).
28. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474.
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expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. 29  As the
foundation for judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment, Brandeis'
specter prevails in modem legislative efforts to protect Fourth Amendment
privacy while granting law enforcement access to the internet.30
Overruling Olmstead, the Supreme Court adopted Brandeis' dissent in
Katz v. United States.31 As a result, federal legislators acted quickly to
regulate federal law enforcement surveillance and to protect the
individual's right to privacy. 32 Congress adopted the Privacy Act of 1974
("Privacy Act") to broadly balance the government's collection, use and
protection of personal information with the Fourth Amendment right to
privacy.33  The Privacy Act's central theme of minimizing collection of
personal information and maximizing public protection 34  laid the
foundation for a wide range of personal information laws such as electronic
surveillance.3 5
In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
("ECPA") 36  to regulate federal surveillance over electronic
communications systems. 37 The ECPA permits and regulates two different
electronic media monitoring techniques. 38 One technique is a wiretap that
29. Id. As internet access grows, computer users reveal more personal identity as they
browse different websites. See Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital
Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093, 1095
(1996). Even under current wire-tap regulations, Carnivore gives the FBI access to any internet
conduct within the bounds of their warrant. See discussion infra Part III.
30. FBI's Carnivore Internet Sifting Software: Panel H of a Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (oral statement of
Rep. Spencer T. Bachus, Member, House Subcomm. on the Constitution) [hereinafter FBI's
Carnivore]. While discussing Carnivore, Representative Bachus concluded: "I think Justice
Brandeis predicted about 40 years ago that one day the government would be able to come into
your home and basically determine everything you did and said. And I think maybe that day's
arrived." Id.
31. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
32. See Teresa Kolb Weil, Comment, Roving Wiretaps: For Your Ears Only, 45 LOY. L.
REv. 745, 751-57 (1999).
33. 5 U.S.C § 552a(e) (1994).
34. Id.
35. See generally Cody, supra note 22, at 1197-1202. Cody discusses the diverse federal
legislation protecting personal information privacy in an array of public and private sectors such
as electronic communications, cable television and modems, banking, video rentals and, of
course, the government. Id.
36. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, 2701-09, 3121-27 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
37. Id. § 2510(14) (defining an electronic communications system as "any wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of electronic
communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic
storage of such communications").
38. Id. §§ 2510-22, 3121-27.
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enables the FBI to intercept the electronic communication and record the
content for evidence. 39 The other technique allows the FBI to identify the
source information with a pen register.40
Both techniques have numerous requirements the FBI must satisfy
before conducting the surveillance.41 If the FBI deviates from these
restrictions, the ECPA mandates procedural penalties, such as excluding
the evidence.42 However, these two surveillance techniques vastly differ in
their approval requirements because court authorization for pen register
surveillance has fewer bureaucratic hurdles 43 and a significantly lower
criteria for judicial approval.44 Additionally, pen register surveillance
triggers less severe penalties for unlawful monitoring 45 than content
interception.46
B. The Strict Legislative Hurdles Regulating Content Interception
Surveillance
To monitor and record the contents of electronic transmissions, the
FBI agent first submits an application to the Attorney General's office to
obtain court authorization.47 If the Attorney General finds that the
surveillance will provide evidence of a crime under one of the enumerated
felonies, 48 the agent must further justify this request by submitting a
39. Id. §§ 2510-22.
40. Id. §§ 3121-27. A pen register is "a device which records or decodes electronic or other
impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to
which such device is attached." Id. § 3127(3). A trap and trace device "captures the incoming
electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number of an instrument or device
from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted." Id. § 3127(4) (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998). Because both devices accomplish the same goal, namely capturing the number dialed
or providing the number of the person who dials, this Comment hereinafter refers to both devices
as a pen register device.
41. Id. §§ 2516, 2518, 3121-23.
42. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-12, 2516, 2520-22, 3121.
43. See id. § 3122.
44. See id. § 3123(a).
45. See id. § 3121(d).
46. See §§ 2516, 2518, 2520.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
48. See id. § 2516(1).
A CONSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE OF CARNIVORE
detailed writing to a court "of competent jurisdiction, ' 49 typically a federal
district court. 50
The court will grant approval if it finds: 1) probable cause for the
agent's belief that the suspect committed or will commit the particular
crime; 5' 2) probable cause for the agent's belief that they will obtain
information relating to the crime by the interception; 52 3) the alternatives
have failed or reasonably appear likely to fail in the future 53 and 4)
probable cause for the agent's belief that the suspect leases, owns or
commonly uses the premises to be monitored.54
Judicial approval requires probable cause for three out of four of the
elements noted above.55 Therefore, the statute remains consistent with the
Katz probable cause requirement for a lawful warrant to search a suspect's
person, property, papers or effects.5 6 The judge's order strictly limits the
surveillance to a specific individual, location and communication for a
period no longer than necessary to gather the information, with a statutory
maximum of thirty days.57
In addition to the strict civil and criminal ramifications for the illegal
interception of electronic transmissions,5 8 regulations further punish the
agents who overstep their bounds by suppressing illegally obtained
evidence.5 9 The regulations also allow the criminal suspect to appeal a
prior judgment based on the illegal transmission.
60
Indeed, authorization for electronic content surveillance presents the
FBI with a time-consuming and onerous burden because of the procedural
hurdles, high constitutional threshold for judicial approval and steep
49. Id. § 2518(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Among the many requirements, an FBI agent's
statement must include: a complete statement of the facts identifying the suspect and justifying
the need to monitor the suspect's electronic transmissions, any failed alternative attempts made to
gather the information, the reason why alternative means are too dangerous and probable cause to
believe the suspect will conduct similar subsequent transmissions. Id.
50. Carnivore Diagnostic Tool, at http://www. fbi.gov/programs/carnivore/camivore2.htm
(last visited Feb. 21, 2001) [hereinafter Carnivore Diagnostic].
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a).
52. Id. § 2518(3)(b).
53. Id. § 2518(3)(c).
54. Id. § 2518(3)(d).
55. See id. § 2518(3).
56. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
57. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4)-(5) (1994).
58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-12, 2516, 2520-22 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
59. Id. § 2518(10)(a).
60. Id. § 2518(10)(b).
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consequences for violation of the order.61 Conversely, approval to gather
source information with a pen register is significantly easier for the FBI to
obtain.62
C. More Lenient Legislative Guidelines Regulating Pen Register Source
Information Surveillance
The Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Maryland63 forged the
critical distinction between the two modes of surveillance-content
interception and source information collection. In Smith, the Court held
that a pen register surveillance is not a search under the Fourth
Amendment, and thus does not require a warrant based on probable
cause. 64 The holding prompted legislators to create specific pen register
laws that vastly differed from content interception regulations.65
Unlike the content surveillance authorization, the pen register
surveillance requires neither approval from the Attorney General's office,
nor restriction of information collection to limited enumerated felonies.
66
The agent need only file an application in court, certifying that the
information is "relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation."
67
The standard for judicial approval is equally low.68 Smith determined
that the Fourth Amendment does not protect source information gathered
by installation and use of a pen register. 69 Therefore, the judge need only
61. Because they are the most relevant to Carnivore, this Comment only discusses five of
the twelve subsections of § 2518. The remaining seven sections present the FBI with similarly
stringent requirements and equally harsh penalties. See id. § 2518.
62. See id. §§ 3121-27 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
63. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
64. Id. at 745 (holding phone number collection with a pen register does not require a
warrant because the "petitioner in all probability entertained no actual expectation of privacy in
the phone numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did, his expectation was not 'legitimate').
65. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (regulating content
interceptions), with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (regulating address or source
information surveillance).
66. Compare § 3122 (stating that the agent may request the source or address information
order if the information sought is "relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being conducted
by that agency"), with § 2516 (requiring the agent submit an application to apply for a content
interception court order, and that the information sought may provide evidence of a list of limited
enumerated felonies).
67. Id. § 3122.
68. Compare § 2518(3) (requiring the judge find probable cause related to criminal
suspicion and surveillance for three of the four judiciary conclusions before issuing a content
interception order), with § 3123(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (ordering the judge find that the pen
register order is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation).
69. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
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find that the information sought by the FBI relates to its criminal
investigation.7 °
Like the content interception warrant, the pen register order is limited
to a specific person and place. 7' Yet, unlike content interception orders,
pen register orders allow a maximum of sixty days of surveillance, which is
twice as long as the thirty days of surveillance permitted under content
interception orders.
72
Finally, the penalties are less severe for illegal pen register
surveillance than illegal content interception surveillance.73 Pen register
laws fail to provide civil damages similar to those imposed for content
interception regulations.74 Further, pen register laws also fail to include an
express evidentiary provision to suppress illegally obtained evidence or
allow an appeal for a conviction based on such evidence.75
The critical legislative difference between the ease of obtaining a pen
register order and the difficulty of obtaining a content interception order
evolved from the Smith ruling that excludes source collection from Fourth
Amendment protection.76 It is bureaucratically easier for the FBI to apply
for a pen register surveillance order.77 The courts may also grant an order
based on a finding that the information gathered would be relevant to the
criminal investigation. 78  Coupled with the lack of civil, evidentiary or
severe criminal penalties,79  pen register surveillance is an easily
implemented and powerful weapon in the FBI's arsenal against crime.
70. § 3123(a).
71. Id. § 3123(b).
72. Compare § 2518(5), with § 3123(c).
73. Compare § 3121(d) (providing the penalty for violating the pen register surveillance
requirements is a fine and/or no more than one year in prison), with id. §§ 2511-12, 2518(10),
2520-22 (imposing an extensive and detailed scheme for civil, evidentiary and significantly more
imposing criminal penalties for violating content interception requirements).
74. Id. § 2520.
75. Id. § 3121(d).
76. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
77. Compare §§ 2516, 2518 (requiring more application steps than the pen register court
order applications), with §§ 3122-23 (imposing less application steps than the content
interception order applications).
78. Compare §§ 2518(3)(a)-(d) (requiring the judge find probable cause related to criminal
suspicion and surveillance for three of the four judiciary conclusions before issuing a content
interception order), with § 3123(a) (ordering the judge find the pen register order relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation).
79. See id. § 3121(d) (imposing a fine and/or less than one year in prison for violating the
pen register order requirements).
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III. FBI's VALIDATIONS FOR CARNIVORE AND ITS CONTROVERSIAL
PUBLIC HISTORY
A. Federal Law Enforcement's Justifications and Expectations for
Carnivore
Carnivore is the FBI's newest technological weapon against crime
80 lafacilitated by the internet . While law enforcement candidly admits that
the name draws negative attention,81 Carnivore is nevertheless a voracious
internet surveyor with mind boggling speed and "surgical" precision.82
1. Executive Inquiry into Internet Crime
In March 2000, the President's Working Group on Unlawful Conduct
on the Internet ("Working Group"), a branch of the DOJ, released a report
documenting the rise of unlawful conduct on the internet.83 Focusing on
crime's growing technological sophistication,84 the Working Group found
that criminals used the internet to commit "traditional crimes. 85
The Working Group reported that the internet, primarily through e-
mail and chat rooms, facilitates the gamut of criminal conduct because the
internet offers privacy, quick file transfer speed, accuracy, "one-to-many"
broadcast ability and other communications features.86  The Working
Group characterized the internet as a safe haven for criminal conduct such
as securities and internet fraud; child pornography; illegal prescription
80. Carnivore Diagnostic, supra note 50.
81. Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (oral statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy Assistant
Att'y General, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice) (labeling Carnivore "unfortunately named").
82. Carnivore Diagnostic, supra note 50.
83. President's Working Group, supra note 4, at 8 (providing evidence that by the end of
2003, there will be 177 million American internet users and 502 million users worldwide).
84. Id. at 10 (describing the three methods of internet use for crime as, "Computers as
Targets," "Computers as Storage Devices" and "Computers as Communications Tools"). While
this Comment focuses on surveillance of computers as real-time communications tools, the FBI
has similar statutory access under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") to
computers for gathering stored information. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-09 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998). For an in-depth discussion on Fourth Amendment privacy when dealing with
monitoring stored information, see Nicole Giallonardo, Note, Steve Jackson Games v. U.S. Secret
Service: The Government's Unauthorized Seizure of Private E-Mail Warrants More Than the
Fifth Circuit's Slap on the Wrist, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 179 (1995).
85. President's Working Group, supra note 4, at 6.
86. Id. at 12.
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drug, controlled substance, firearm and alcohol sales; gambling; software
piracy and intellectual property theft.87
Based on its own conclusions about internet crime, the FBI found that
the internet facilitates more violent criminal conduct.88 The FBI advised
that monitoring internet communications would help prevent terrorism,
espionage, child pornography, sexual exploitation of children, serious fraud
and "information warfare."
89
To meet the constitutional and regulatory requirements of the Fourth
Amendment and the ECPA,90 law enforcement relies on the assumption
that internet use is analogous to telephone use.91 Following from this
technological analogy, the FBI and DOJ concluded that current
surveillance laws under the ECPA92 are more than sufficient to safeguard
93the internet user's Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
87. See id. (emphasizing in the appendices that, except the illegal sale of alcohol, federal
law enforcement agencies need more resources to conduct effective online investigations).
88. See Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Dir.,
FBI).
89. Id. The FBI defines information warfare as the threat that foreign militaries, "[k]nowing
that they cannot match our military might," will develop programs to attack our national
infrastructure. Id. The FBI fears that information warfare will be more apocalyptic to our
national security than weapons of mass destruction. Id.
90. See discussion supra Part II.
91. President's Working Group, supra note 4, at 12 (emphasizing "the use of computers and
modem telecommunications facilities as tools (analogous to the use of telephones as tools) to
commit an offense."); David McGuire, FBI Defends 'Carnivore' Cyber-Snoop Device,
NEWSBYTES, July 11, 2000 (quoting FBI spokesperson Paul Bresson who claimed that Carnivore
is merely an extension of the FBI's wiretapping practices to e-mail).
92. See discussion supra Part II.
93. See, Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy
Assistant Att'y General, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice) (claiming that current surveillance
regulations, in the context of the internet, are constitutional and impose DOJ privacy protection
measures that go beyond constitutional requirements); Carnivore Diagnostic, supra note 50
(detailing the application process for a content interception order pursuant to the ECPA and
characterizing this process as much more difficult than attaining "typical search warrants");
Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's "Carnivore" Program: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong., 11-12 (2000),
(prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Dir., FBI) (emphasizing that the federal
surveillance laws promote the Fourth Amendment "with deference to the privacy of intercepted
subjects and with deference to the privacy of those who are not the subject of the court order")
[hereinafter Fourth Amendment Issues].
20011
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2. The FBI's Response to Internet Crime: Carnivore's Birth
Two years ago, unbeknownst to the DOJ,94 the FBI implemented
Carnivore to monitor criminal activities on the internet. 95  Carnivore is
essentially a commercial "sniffer," which is a program that internet service
providers ("ISP") employ to intercept digital information passing through
their servers.96 Consisting of both hardware, referred to as a "black box, 97
and software that the FBI attaches to an ISP's system, Carnivore filters all
the digital code that passes through the ISP's server.98 The FBI programs
Carnivore to retain information described in the court order for the amount
of time the surveillance statute permits. 99 Because the FBI can already
constitutionally access information stored on a server or hard drive under
other provisions of the ECPA,'00 Carnivore collects data in real-time, or at
the same time the information streams through the server. 101 Carnivore can
collect any digitally transmitted information such as the suspect's e-mail,
instant messaging, chat-room discussions, financial transactions and
websites visited.
10 2
Once the FBI gains surveillance approval by a court order,'0 3 the FBI
agent, with help from the ISP's representative, installs Carnivore onto the
ISP's network. 10 4 Because the ECPA mandates cooperation, the ISP may
94. See Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (oral statement of Martha Stansell-Gamm, Chief,
Computer Crimes, U.S. Dep't of Justice) (responding to Sen. Hatch's query about the DOJ's
reported lack of involvement with, or knowledge of, Carnivore until the press exposed the
program: "I simply don't know at what point the attorney general became aware of this specific
tool or the name of the tool.").
95. Id. (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Dir., FBI).
96. Carnivore Diagnostic, supra note 50 (stating that private ISPs and companies regularly
purchase and employ commercial sniffers to capture information on their servers). The FBI
distinguishes Carnivore from the commercial sniffers in that Carnivore captures only limited
information, whereas commercial sniffers capture everything transmitted through ISPs. Id.
97. Qaisar Alam, E-mail Surveillance: Carnivore Cornered, COMPUTERS TODAY, Oct. 31,
2000, at 48.
98. Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Dir., FBI).
99. Id.
100. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
101. See Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Dir., FBI).
102. Fourth Amendment Issues, supra note 93 (statement of Christopher Painter, Deputy
Chief, Computer Crimes, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
103. See discussion supra Part II.
104. See Fourth Amendment Issues, supra note 93 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr,
Assistant Dir., FBI) (stating that "[t]o date, Carnivore has, to my knowledge, never been installed
onto an ISP's network without assistance from the ISP's technical personnel").
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not prevent the FBI from installing Carnivore on its system. 10 5  After
installing the device, the agent, without the ISP's help, programs the
software to filter out all information of a suspect's internet use, restricted
by the ECPA guidelines in the court order.
10 6
Once installed, Carnivore operates in four stages. 10 7 First, Carnivore
filters, at forty million mega-bits per second or faster, all of the digital
information that streams through the ISP. 108 Thus, Carnivore processes all
information originating from non-suspect internet users. The FBI claims
that while filtering the code, Carnivore detects and segregates only the
surveillance information that conforms with the court order. 109
Once Carnivore segregates the relevant information, the second stage
begins. Carnivore further filters the data based on the type of ECPA
surveillance order and court restrictions. 110 The FBI claims that the second
stage "is where some of Carnivore's key legal, evidentiary, and privacy-
enhancing features really kick in." '111 For example, the program can retain
e-mail address information as permitted by a pen register order, while
disposing of any other data that would violate the ECPA court order."12
In the third stage, Carnivore stores the collected information for the
agent's review. 113 If properly conducted, 14 the search provides the agent
with only the information that the court expressly authorized.' '5
Carnivore then finalizes its surveillance by recording the FBI search
protocol. 116 As a prerequisite to admitting Carnivore's search results into
105. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4), 3124(a)-(b) (1994) (ordering the communications provider
shall furnish law enforcement with all "information, facilities, and technical assistance" to
facilitate the content or source information surveillance).
106. See, e.g., Carnivore Diagnostic, supra note 50 (stating that if the court order is only for
an e-mail search, the agent must program Carnivore to intercept only the suspect's e-mail).
107. See Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant
Dir., FBI).
108. Id. To illustrate Carnivore's speed, Donald Kerr analogizes: "To visualize this,
imagine a huge screen containing 40 million O's [sic] and I's flashing by on this screen for one
second, and for one second only." Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant
Dir., FBI).
114. See discussion infra Part IV (casting doubt on the FBI's claim that Carnivore will
consistently produce results conforming to the court order).
115. Carnivore Diagnostic, supra note 50.
116. Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Dir.,
FBI).
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evidence, the FBI must illustrate an unadulterated evidentiary chain." 7 The
best proof of this chain is an FBI programmer's testimony that the search
protocol adhered to the court order. 18  Moreover, by automatically
appending the search protocol to the results, Carnivore authenticates the
evidence so the court will not have to speculate about overbroad search
results in violation of the court order. 19
Clearly, the Working Group's wish for federal computer crime
surveillance training, resources and tools came true when it discovered
Carnivore and other similar technology. 120  Since public discovery of
Carnivore, both the FBI and DOJ continue to advance the constitutionality
of Carnivore while failing to conduct a public, in-depth review.' 2 ' The
program's brief and controversial public history, however, reveals that
other groups are skeptical of Carnivore's ability to comply with Fourth
Amendment privacy rights.' 
22
B. Carnivore's Heavily Scrutinized Public History
To avoid facing Fourth Amendment and federal surveillance statutory
criticisms threatened by this Orwellian dilemma, 123  the FBI tailored
Carnivore's protocol to adhere to the ECPA. 2 4  Because the ECPA
mandates ISP submission to FBI searches, 125 Carnivore allows the FBI
unlimited, real-time access to everything that passes through the monitored
117. See id.; FED. R. EVID. 901.
118. See Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant
Dir., FBI).
119. See id.
120. President's Working Group, supra note 4, at 25-31; Digital Privacy, supra note 3
(statement of Martha Stansell-Gamm, Chief, Computer Crimes, U.S. Dep't of Justice) (revealing
that for the past three years, federal agencies employed many similar programs such as Omnivore,
Network Intrusion Defense System and SNIFFY). Id. Martha Stansell-Gamm also admitted that
these programs provided agencies with even less selection, discretion and control than Carnivore.
See id. This suggests that federal agencies have already violated internet user's Fourth
Amendment privacy.
121. Compare Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Dir.,
FBI) (justifying Carnivore's procedures as consistent with the Fourth Amendment), with Digital
Privacy, supra note 3 (statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Att'y General,
Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice) (illustrating that the DOJ and the FBI take similar positions
finding Carnivore consistent with the Fourth Amendment).
122. See discussion infra Part III.B.
123. Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (oral statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Member, S.
Judiciary Comm.) (predicting that "individuals who use the Internet for personal communications,
purchases and hobbies are justifiably reluctant to allow an Orwellian Big Brother to monitor
which web sites they visit or what messages they send through cyberspace").
124. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, 3121-27 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
125. Id. §§ 2518(4), 3124(a)-(b).
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ISP. Despite the FBI's reassurances that the program enhances internet
privacy, 126 privacy experts, 127 the internet industry,' 28 the press129 and
federal lawmakers voiced their fears of Carnivore. As a result, the House
and Senate both held Judiciary Committee Hearings immediately after
Carnivore's public exposure. 130  These hearings served to clarify what
Carnivore actually accomplishes and whether Carnivore protects the
privacy of non-criminal internet users.' 3 '
After the FBI revealed to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees
that it had secretly used Carnivore twenty-five times in its first two years,
32
Carnivore became very unpopular. Immediately proceeding the House
Judiciary Committee Hearing, 133 twenty-eight members of Congress wrote
Attorney General Janet Reno, demanding that she shut down Carnivore.
34
While the DOJ did not terminate the program, it ultimately responded to
public and political criticism by suspending Carnivore for an
independent
135 technical review.
36
126. See Carnivore Diagnostic, supra note 50.
127. E.g., Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Urges Congress to Put a Leash on 'Carnivore' and
Other Government Snoopware Programs (July 12, 2000), available at
http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/n07i200b.html; Electronic Privacy Information Center: EPIC
Alert 7.13, at http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC_Alert_7.13.html (discussing criticism of Carnivore
and the associated privacy risks).
128. E.g., Del Quentin Wilber, FBI Taps of E-mail Provoke Concerns; Privacy Issues Lead
to House Hearings on 'Carnivore' Work; Name Called 'Unfortunate,' THE BALTIMORE SUN,
July 24, 2000, available at http://www.newslibrary.com/deliverccdoc.asp?SMH 60919
(discussing ISP criticisms of Carnivore, including the efforts of Earthlink to prevent the FBI from
installing Carnivore on its network).
129. E.g., Neil King, Jr., FBI'S Wiretaps to Scan E-Mail Spark Concern, WALL ST. J., July
11, 2000, at A3 (exposing Carnivore to the public for the first time).
130. See generally Fourth Amendment Issues, supra note 93, at 2 (opening statement of
Rep. Canady, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary)
(noting the hearing was to address the interests of Fourth Amendment protection and law
enforcement).
131. See id.
132. Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Dir.,
FBI).
133. FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30. The hearing took place on July 24, 2000. Id.
134. Shruti Date, Judge Issues Ruling on FBI Filtering App, GOV'T COMPUTER NEWS, Aug.
7, 2000, at 68.
135. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Says Government Stacked Deck in Selection of Team to
Review "Carnivore" Cyber-tapping System (Oct. 4, 2000), available at
http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/nl00400.html [hereinafter ACLU Press Release]. While it is a
clear conflict of interest to have the DOJ review Carnivore, computer privacy advocates criticized
the DOJ's "independent" review team because the team consisted of many former law
enforcement agents, including a former DOJ official and President Clinton's information policy
advisor. Id.
136. McGuire, supra note 13.
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Following the hearings, the DOJ contracted with the Illinois Institute
of Technology Research Institute ("IITRI") to test Carnivore in various
model scenarios simulating law enforcement's likely use of the program to
determine Carnivore's "design, function and method of use."
137
Essentially, the IITRI review addressed concerns that Carnivore is a
technically insecure tool, impairs an ISP's network and leaks more data
than FBI surveillance court orders authorize. 13 8  Computer privacy
advocates expressed further concern that, if Carnivore's interceptions result
in exposing too much information about the ISP's non-suspect customers,
the FBI or a third party will inevitably exploit that information.'
39
In December 2000, the DOJ released the results of the IITRI's
technical review that found Carnivore operated as the FBI expected., 40 In
its conclusion that Carnivore is technically sound, the IITRI encouraged the
FBI to continue using the program.'14  Ultimately, Carnivore's successful
technical review bolstered the FBI's claims that Carnivore neither leaks
information outside of the court order parameters, nor interferes with the
monitored ISP's network.
142
137. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Selects Team to Review
Carnivore System (Sept. 26, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2000
September/565jmd.htm.
138. See Contract No. 00-C-0328 for Independent Technical Review of the Carnivore
System, U.S. Dep't of Justice, at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/pss/ iitricontracttext.pdf (last visited
Nov. 9, 2000). One wonders whether IITRI's use of Carnivore violated the Fourth Amendment
and the federal statutes, especially because they probably did not apply for a court order with
every test conducted.
139. Id. After describing the adverse reaction Carnivore generated in the media, Congress
and general public, in the contract introduction, the DOJ poses four questions in Section ES. 1 as
the technical review objectives:
1. Assuming proper usage, will the Carnivore system provide investigators with
all the information, and only the information, that is designed and set to
provide in accordance with a given court order?
2. Assuming proper usage, will use of the Carnivore system introduce new,
material risks of operational security impairment of an ISP's network?
3. Does use of the Carnivore system introduce new, material risks of the
unauthorized acquisition, whether intentional or unintentional, of electronic
communication information by (i) FBI personnel or (ii) persons other than FBI
personnel?
4. Are the protections built into the Carnivore system, including both audit
functions and operational procedures or practices, commensurate with the
level of the risks, if any, identified in response to (3) above?
Id.
140. See ILL. INST. OF TECH., supra note 14, at xii.
141. Id. at xiv (stating law enforcement should "[c]ontinue to use Carnivore ... because
Carnivore can be configured to reflect the limitations of a court order").
142. See id. at xii. In its conclusions, the IITRI answered the DOJ's four questions,
declaring:
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Despite these test results, Carnivore's critics maintain that the
program is vulnerable to abuse until the FBI releases the source code to the
public.14 3  From the moment the DOJ announced the IITRI review team,
critics alleged that the DOJ assembled a biased review panel because nearly
all of their team had strong federal government and law enforcement ties.'44
Moreover, because the DOJ conducted a technical, rather than legal
review, 145 the IITRI study addressed only a minor part of the public
controversy over Carnivore. Carnivore's technical review gave the FBI
official justification for the program's full implementation. However, the
DOJ's failure to conduct a legal review of the program prompted computer
privacy advocates to use the Fourth Amendment to criticize Carnivore.
1. When Carnivore is used in accordance with a Title III order, it provides
investigators with no more information than is permitted by a given court
order. When Carnivore is used under pen trap authorization it collects TO and
FROM information, and also indicates the length of messages and the length
of individual field within those messages possibly exceeding court-permitted
collection.
2. Operating Carnivore introduces no operational or security risks to the ISP
network where it is installed unless the ISP must to [sic] make changes to its
network to accommodate Carnivore. Such changes may introduce unexpected
network behavior.
3. Carnivore reduces, but does not eliminate, risk of both intentional and
unintentional unauthorized acquisition of electronic communication
information by FBI personnel, but introduces little additional risk of
acquisition by persons other than FBI personnel.
4. While operational procedures or practices appear sound, Carnivore does not
provide protections, especially audit functions, commensurate with the level
of the risks.
Id.
143. See FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Barry Steinhardt, Assoc. Dir.,
ACLU) (criticizing the FBI's "[Tirust us; we do not know how this black box works" explanation
offered to privacy advocates concerned with Carnivore); Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (statement
of James X. Dempsey, Senior Staff Counsel, Ctr. for Democracy and Tech.) (claiming that the
first problem with Carnivore is "we don't know how it works."); Press Release, Electronic
Privacy Information Center, Lawsuit Seeks Immediate Release of FBI Carnivore Documents
(Aug. 2, 2000), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/8 02 release.html
(announcing the Electronic Privacy Information Center's Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
against the FBI and DOJ to request more detailed information on Carnivore).
144. ACLU Press Release, supra note 135.
145. ILL. INST. OF TECH., supra note 14, at xiv (stating that "IITRI specifically excluded
questions of constitutionality").
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IV. BALANCING PRIVACY AGAINST GOVERNMENT INTERESTS:
RESTRICTING CARNIVORE TO MAXIMIZE THE INTERNET USER'S FOURTH
AMENDMENT PRIVACY RIGHTS WHILE RESPECTING LAW ENFORCEMENT'S
NEED FOR INTERNET SURVEILLANCE
As internet use increases, our lives and identities grow more digitized
every day. 146  Today, an internet user can literally survive without ever
leaving home. 147  The internet is a massive system of connections and
digital code that transmits personal information ranging from business
transactions and online consumer purchases to simple recreational digital
conversation. 148
Transmitting personal information on the internet leaves the user
vulnerable to those who might exploit that content. ISPs encourage people
to participate in online transactions by implementing security measures to
raise expectations regarding internet privacy. 149  The FBI claims that
installing Carnivore onto an ISP enhances internet security because it helps
them catch cyber criminals. 50 Unfortunately, critics find it difficult to
believe this reassurance because Carnivore expands the FBI's ability to
monitor people's lives by gathering information that traditional telephone
surveillance would never reveal. 1
5'
The DOJ's review of Carnivore leaves constitutional objections
unresolved. 52  Because the FBI and DOJ rely on the analogy that the
internet is like a telephone, federal law enforcement will stand by their
146. See Adler, supra note 29, at 1095 (explaining some of the increasing advantages of the
internet).
147. See, e.g., http://www.homegrocer.com (for purchasing groceries on the internet);
http://www.etrade.com (for trading stocks on the internet); http://www.travel.com (for making
travel arrangements on the internet); http://www.hotbot.com (for shopping on the internet);
http://www.allmusic.com (for researching music on the internet).
148. Paul Swart, Chip Equipment Firms Bullish at Semicon West, ELECTRONIC TIMES, July
24, 2000, at 16 (stating that "the Internet is playing an ever greater role in business and personal
lives, the massive network will generate and drive demand for many types of devices that will
hook up to the Net-from smart home appliances such as microwave ovens that are remotely
controlled by specialised [sic] websites, to Web-capable cellphones to TV set-top boxes and
palm-type information appliances").
149. Id.
150. See Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant
Dir., FBI).
151. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1.
152. See ILL. INST. OF TECH., supra note 14, at xiv (acknowledging that although IIRTI
specifically excluded constitutional questions from its review, it warned that "the presence of
Carnivore and its successors without safeguards ... 1) fuels the concerns of responsible privacy
advocates and reduces the expectations of privacy by citizens at large and 2) increases public
concern about the potential unauthorized activity of law enforcement agents").
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claims that Carnivore is constitutional under current surveillance
regulations and prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
153
On the other hand, privacy advocates promise not to back down from
their criticism that Carnivore, while possibly technologically sound, is
unconstitutional. 154 Legal precedent, the FBI's wiretapping protocol and
the inherent, technological differences between the internet and the
telephone suggest that even a perfectly functional Carnivore compromises
privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment. 1
55
A. Raising the Judicial Standard: Using Legal Precedent To Protect Pen
Register Source Information Surveillance Under the Fourth Amendment
1. Carnivore's Source Information Collection on the Internet Substantially
Differs from Pen Register Searches on a Telephone
Assuming Carnivore operates exactly as the FBI claims, 56 law
enforcement's collection of source information via current ECPA pen
register regulations violates the Fourth Amendment despite the FBI's
meticulous efforts to tailor Carnivore to ECPA standards.
Katz v. United States157 is the foundation for today's Fourth
Amendment surveillance regulations. 58  In Katz, the Supreme Court
focused on the individual's privacy expectations when determining whether
the individual deserves Fourth Amendment protection from government
surveillance. 159  The Court ruled the Fourth Amendment prevents the
government from probing information that the individual "seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public,"' 160 without a warrant
based on probable cause. 161 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect information the individual "knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office."'
162
153. See discussion supra Parts 11-111.
154. See FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Barry Steinhardt, Assoc. Dir.,
ACLU); Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (oral statement of Michael O'Neill, Assistant Professor,
George Mason Univ. Law Sch.; Comm'r U.S. Sentencing Comm'n); Digital Privacy, supra note
3 (oral statement of James X. Dempsey, Senior Staff Counsel, Ctr. for Democracy and Tech.).
155. See discussion infra Parts IV.A-D.
156. See discussion infra Part III.B.
157. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
158. See Cody, supra note 22, at 1194.
159. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
160. Id. at 35 1.
161. See id. at 358-59.
162. Id. at 351.
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In Smith v. Maryland,1 63 the Supreme Court summarized the privacy
expectation test by adopting Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz and
posing two questions: 1) does the individual's conduct show they
subjectively expected privacy, and, if so, 2) does society recognize that
expectation as reasonable?' 64 The Fourth Amendment will protect that
individual's information only if the court finds an affirmative answer to
both questions. 165
To decide whether pen register surveillance requires Fourth
Amendment probable cause, the Smith Court adopted the holding in United
States v. New York Telephone Co. 16 6 The Court held that a pen register
only discloses the telephone numbers a suspect dials, while preventing the
disclosure of "any communication between the caller and the recipient of
the call, their identities ... [and] whether the call was even completed.
1 67
Based on this definition, the Smith Court concluded that a pen register has
"limited capabilities."'
168
Applying the Katz test to the pen register's limited capabilities, the
Court found that because phone companies employ pen registers and
telephone subscribers receive an itemized phone bill, "it is too much to
believe that telephone subscribers ... harbor any general expectation that
the numbers they dial will remain secret." 169  Additionally, the Court
emphasized that because the automated switchboard is "the modem
counterpart"'' 70 of the human operator switchboard, the Constitution will
not grant special protection for individuals just because of subsequent
automation.'
17
Ultimately, the Smith Court concluded that the petitioner failed the
Katz test because he did not subjectively expect privacy in the numbers he
dialed, and "even if he did, his expectation was not 'legitimate.""
'172
Additionally, the Smith Court held that because a reasonable person cannot
justifiably expect the numbers they dial to be confidential, pen register
163. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
164. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
165. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
166. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
167. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (quoting N. Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167). Additionally, the New
York Telephone Court found that "pen registers do not accomplish the 'aural acquisition' of
anything." N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167.
168. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
169. Id. at 743.
170. Id. at 744.
171. Id. at 744-45.
172. Id. at 745.
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surveillance, even without probable cause, does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 
73
Today's ECPA surveillance regulations reflect the federal
government's statutory restrictions on the Smith Court's decision that a pen
register search does not require a warrant. The ECPA requires that the FBI
obtain approval based on a minimal level of suspicion that the source
information sought by a pen register must relate to a criminal investigation
before conducting surveillance. 74 While Carnivore is not a pen register
device per se,175 the FBI clearly programmed Carnivore to emulate a pen
register.176  Thus, federal law enforcement's primary justification for
Carnivore rests on a broad assumption that Carnivore's implementation is
analogous to current telephone surveillance practices. 177 However, when
comparing Carnivore's wide range of capabilities with those of a pen
register, 7 it is clear that Carnivore is not a tool of the same "limited
capabilities."'
179
Carnivore, unlike the pen register, is technologically capable of
disclosing "any communication between the caller and the recipient of the
call, their identities ... [and] whether the call was even completed."'
' 80
Therefore, the Smith Court would likely disagree with the FBI's conclusion
that Carnivore is technologically analogous to a pen register. Even though
the FBI can try to emulate pen register surveillance by programming
Carnivore to expel content and retain only source information,' 81 internet
source information reveals significantly more detailed information about
the user than a mere telephone number could ever demonstrate.' 
82
173. Id. at 745-46.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
175. See FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (prepared statement of Tom Perrine, Principal
Investigator, Pacific Inst. for Computer Security) (describing the capabilities of Carnivore and the
differences between the internet and telephones).
176. See Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant
Dir., FBI) (discussing how Carnivore operates and complies with EPCA regulations).
177. President's Working Group, supra note 4, at 12 (emphasizing "the use of computers
and modem telecommunication facilities (analogous to the use of telephones as tools) to commit
an offense"); David McGuire, FBI Defends 'Carnivore' Cyber-Snoop Device, NEWSBYTES, at
http://www.newsbytes.com/news/00/15943.html (July 11, 2000) (citing an FBI contention that
Carnivore is merely an extension of the FBI's wiretapping practices to e-mail).
178. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741-42.
179. Id. at 742.
180. Id. at 741 (citing N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167).
181. Carnivore Diagnostic, supra note 50.
182. FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Alan B. Davidson, Staff Counsel,
Ctr. for Democracy and Tech.).
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For instance, if Carnivore were to search e-mail in a manner
analogous to a pen register, it would isolate and store only the sender and
recipient e-mail addresses.1 83 Unlike a pen register, however, Carnivore
downloads and reads all of the digital code that passes through the ISP for
the court order's duration. 84 This means that Carnivore will not only read
all of a suspect's e-mail, but it will also read all other e-mail on the
server'185 Additionally, it determines what websites they visit, monitors
their chat-room discussions and combs through all of their file transfers.'
86
Because Carnivore temporarily acquires all of the digital code on the ISP's
network, an overwhelming amount of the code originates from the ISP's
non-criminal clients. 87  Furthermore, because e-mails necessarily pass
directly through the ISP's network, Carnivore collects all sender and
recipient addresses, instantly recording the exact times senders complete
the communication. 188
In contrast to Carnivore's rapid processing speed, wide surveillance
ability and technological sophistication, a pen register only produces
telephone numbers. 89 In United States v. New York Telephone Co., the
Court described the pen register as a machine of limited capabilities'9"
because its surveillance fails to disclose the identities of the callers, does
not indicate whether the suspect completed the call and is incapable of the
"aural acquisition ' 91 of anything, it just produces telephone numbers.' 92
Carnivore, even when programmed by the FBI to operate like a pen
register, fails to produce such limited results because it reveals the sender's
and recipient's identities by collecting e-mail addresses. It also intercepts a
183. See Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant
Dir., FBI).
184. FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Tom Perrine, Principal Investigator,
Pacific Inst. for Computer Security).
185. See id. (oral statement of Alan B. Davidson, Staff Counsel, Ctr. for Democracy and
Tech.).
186. See id.
187. See generally id. (oral statement of Stewart Baker, Att'y, Steptoe & Johnson)
(discussing how innocent users may be unfairly monitored).
188. See Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant
Dir., FBI). Dr. Kerr stated that, because Carnivore operates so quickly, an agent could never
review the information passing through it in real-time. Id. However, as long as Carnivore reads
transmissions in real-time, it is capable of determining the exact time a user sends an e-mail
because it will receive it the moment the user transmits it through Carnivore. Furthermore,
Carnivore's auditing capabilities may include a time stamp if transmission time is important for
establishing the evidentiary chain. See id.
189. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167.
190. Id.
191. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1994).
192. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167.
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suspect's e-mail the instant the sender completes correspondence and
temporarily acquires all digital code, the vast majority of which originates
from non-suspect internet users.' 
93
In addition, the internet source information Carnivore collects
encompasses a diverse array of electronic signatures that attach to all
information on the internet. 194  Because the internet provides broad
communication abilities through services such as e-mail, web sites, chat
rooms and video streaming, source information can include everything
from sender and recipient e-mail addresses1 95 to an author's identification
macro embedded in a transferred file.
196
Even when the source does not provide a specific name or e-mail
address, source information, like a website's Uniform Resource Locator
("URL"),197 often reveals the content of the particular website.198 In fact,
even when the URL fails to reveal the content of a website, the FBI is free
to access that site to determine whether the suspect employed it for
criminal purposes. Carnivore is a "maximization tool,"'199 giving the FBI
access to all communication sources passing through ISP networks.2 °°
Unlike a pen register, Carnivore allows the FBI to probe deeply into a
specific person's internet use, exposing more information about that
193. See FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Stewart Baker, Att'y, Steptoe &
Johnson) (discussing how innocent users can be unfairly monitored).
194. See Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (oral statement of Dr. Vinton G. Cerf, Member, Bd.
of Dirs., Internet Soc'y) (explaining how Carnivore views flowing source information on the
internet).
195. See FBIs Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Alan B. Davidson, Staff
Counsel, Ctr. for Democracy and Tech.).
196. Mary Huhn, An Inventory ofthe Body Count from Melissa, N.Y. POST, Apr. 4, 1999, at
59, available at http://promotions.nypost.com/040499/9620.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2001)
(discussing Microsoft's macros, or program code, indicating the alias of the Melissa virus' author,
"Kwyjibo").
197. A URL is a web address where a person can find a website on the internet.
198. URL's such as http://www.eactivist.org, http://www.carprice.com and http://www.
pom.com illustrate the pages' general subject matter. A URL may also reveal the terms for which
the internet user searches. For example, on the popular search engine, Yahoo!
(http://www.yahoo.com), if a user wants to find information on fertilizer, a substance often used
to make explosives, the search term "fertilizer" becomes a part of the URL: http://search.yahoo.
com/bin/search?p=fertilizer. If the FBI were permitted to monitor URLs under the pen register
laws, presumably the FBI could use Carnivore's source information surveillance to investigate
similar internet searches without even establishing probable cause so long as their source
information collection is relevant to investigating criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (1994).
199. FBIs Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Barry Steinhardt, Assoc. Dir.,
ACLU).
200. Id.
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person's identity, private habits and daily personal contacts than a mere
telephone number ever reveals.2°'
2. Carnivore's Source Information Collection Is an Unconstitutional
Search Because It Fails the Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
While the FBI claims it can program Carnivore to emulate a pen
register,20 2 clearly Carnivore is not the same surveillance device of limited
capabilities upon which the Smith Court relied.20 3 Even under the unlikely
assumption that the Smith Court intended its ruling to apply to a device of
such widespread capabilities, Carnivore would still fail the privacy
expectation test originating from Harlan's concurrence in Katz.
20 4
The Smith Court applied the Katz two-prong test and found that pen
register surveillance does not offend a reasonable expectation of privacy.2 °5
In its inquiry, the Court posed two questions: 1) whether the individual's
conduct shows a subjective expectation of privacy, and if so, 2) whether
society recognizes that expectation as reasonable? 20 6 The answer to the
first question rests on the individual's subjective intent, but the second
question provides the more objective and relevant standard for this test. 207
Does society recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy for source
information on the internet? Once again, the distinct technological
advantages of Carnivore contrasted with the very limited capabilities of a
pen register lead to a different answer than the one the Smith Court
addressed.
Smith analyzed the relationship between the telephone user and the
telephone company by focusing on the company's business practices to
determine whether the customer's expectation of privacy in the phone
numbers dialed is reasonable.20 8 The Court ultimately concluded that a
reasonable person would not legitimately expect privacy in the phone
numbers dialed.20 9 The Court based its decision on three findings. First,
the Court found that customers convey their phone numbers to the
201. See id.
202. See Carnivore Diagnostic, supra note 50.
203. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
204. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
205. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
206. Id. at 740.
207. Id. at 741-46. The Smith Court primarily focused its analysis on the second question.
Id.
208. Id. at 735.
209. Id. at 745.
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telephone company's switchboard.1 ° Second, the customer knows that the
phone company records phone numbers dialed because it sends a list of
phone numbers in its long-distance bill.211 Finally, even if the user remains
"oblivious to a pen register's esoteric functions," 212 the Court presumed
that everyone knows that phone companies use pen registers to track
calls.213 The Court based this finding on the fact that most phone books
have a customer information page that states that the phone company can
acquire an obscene caller's phone number for the authorities.21 4 Clearly,
these findings do not describe a user's expectations when communicating
on the internet.
The Smith Court's rationale does not apply to internet users for three
reasons. First, the internet user does not knowingly convey source
information to the ISP in the same way the telephone customer conveys
phone numbers to the telephone company. Unlike the telephone
switchboard, an ISP's network has always been a fully computerized
system without human operators to physically input websites or e-mail
addresses for people.21 5 Although telephone companies continue to employ
human operators for certain services despite significant automation, 21 6 the
internet user is the only human to type in a URL, log onto a chat site or
send an e-mail.
Second, while ISPs use sniffers like Carnivore to maintain their
systems, much like the phone company uses pen registers in its
maintenance, 2 17 ISPs do not send a monthly itemized bill.2 18 According to
Smith, without a billing system such as a monthly itemized statement,
people may not even know their ISP employs a sniffer in the first place.219
210. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. The Court further described the switchboard as the "modem
counterpart" of the human operator. Id.
211. Id. at 742-43.
212. Id. at 742.
213. Id. at 743.
214. Id. at 742-43.
215. See Chris Ayres, Putting Words in the Mouth of the Internet, TIMES (London), Oct. 22,
1998 (discussing how computer companies are attempting to humanize their digital operators).
216. See Language Legalities Increase Personnel Officials, Immigrants Fight Drawl Debate
While Speech Patterns Continue to Promote Stereotypes, AUGUSTA CHRON., Sept. 24, 2000, at
A 17 (discussing the firing of bilingual telephone operators hired for collect calls).
217. FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Tom Perrine, Principal investigator,
Pacific Inst. for Computer Sec.).
218. See FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Stewart Baker, Att'y, Steptoe &
Johnson).
219. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-46.
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Finally, because people now conduct more of their personal, business
and commercial lives online,22° one of the most important services an ISP
offers is a secure connection. Unlike a telephone company phone book,
ISP sites do not advertise their capacity to review code that passes through
their networks to track obscene e-mail.2 22 Rather, ISPs have a significantly
stronger capital interest to insure that their customers' information does not
get into the hands of someone who might abuse it,223 including the
government. While the internet has established its strong presence in our
224economy, a computer connected to the internet would not be a common
household appliance if ISPs failed to secure their networks. 2 5  Thus,
society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy for internet source
information.
The inherent differences between the rich source information
Carnivore collects and the simple telephone numbers a pen register collects
reveal that Carnivore is not a device of the same limited capabilities as a
pen register. Additionally, society places significant expectations on ISPs
to keep their internet traffic private, leading to a reasonable expectation that
the public or government will not see the source information it conveys to
their ISPs. When ruling that pen register surveillance does not require
Fourth Amendment protection, the Smith Court did not likely envision a
relatively limitless device like Carnivore. 226  For this reason, the Fourth
Amendment should restrain Carnivore's source information surveillance
and require the FBI to establish probable cause before unleashing
Carnivore's vast capabilities to interfere with privacy.
220. See, e.g., http://www.homegrocer.com (for purchasing groceries on the internet);
http://www.etrade.com (for trading stocks on the internet); http://www.travel.com (for making
travel arrangements on the internet); http://www.hotbot.com (for shopping on the internet);
http://www.allmusic.com (for researching music on the internet).
221. Julia King, Security Concerns Boost Vendors' Value, COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 3, 2000,
at 89.
222. See, e.g., http://www.aol.com; http://www.earthlink.com; http://www.msn. com.
223. PR Newswire, Network Associates and Ingram Micro Partner to Provide Active
Security Special Agent Program to Top Industry Resellers (Dec. 8, 1999), at
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/storie.. .5&story-/www/story/12-08-1999/0001091481
(quoting Bob Bennett, vice president and general manager, of Enterprise Solutions Group at
Ingram Micro who said, "[a]s the e-business economy grows, more businesses realize the vital
importance of network security to their success and survival") [hereinafter PR Newswire].
224. See Joe Salkowski, Senate Bill Would Kill Internet Bugs with Federal Hatchet, CHI.
TRIB., June 5, 2000, at 6.
225. See, e.g., Benedict Carey, Web Plays 2 Roles in Casual Sex, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2000,
at S1 (stating that, "[b]ecause of privacy agreements, Internet service providers are reluctant to
provide personal details about their customers").
226. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
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B. Condemning Carnivore's Dragnet Tactics: Employing Additional Legal
Precedent to Expose the Fourth Amendment Threat of Carnivore's Broad
Search Protocol
Because Carnivore must scan all of the digital code on an ISP's
227network to extract the single suspect's information, its broad use poses
further threats to Fourth Amendment privacy. Combing through all of the
digital code that runs through a network significantly differs from
wiretapping a telephone line because the vast majority of the information
228Carnivore scans comes from innocent users.
The Supreme Court has warned that "a search which is reasonable at
its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable
intensity and scope. 22 9  Even if the FBI establishes probable cause to
monitor a suspect, a court may find Carnivore's ability to intensely
intercept more than forty million mega-bits of digital code per second2 30 is
too intolerable an intensity, unlike a traditional low-tech wiretap on a
telephone conversation. In addition, because Carnivore broadly scans each
ISP customer's digital code, 231 a court may find that Carnivore's searches
violate the Fourth Amendment.
More specifically, Carnivore surveillance constitutes an internet
dragnet. Despite the FBI's reassurance that Carnivore is a minimalization
tool because of its precise filters, 32 scanning all of the digital code that
streams over an ISP to gather incriminating information on a single suspect
is an excessive tactic. By analogy, if the FBI were to conduct traditional
telephone wiretaps in the same manner, it would have to divert every phone
line from all users' homes and offices through an FBI listening station just
to find one person's conversation.
Because internet privacy is so important to an ISP's customers, the
mere threat that Carnivore may be reading all of the digital code on any
227. FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Barry Steinhardt, Assoc. Dir.,
ACLU).
228. Id. (prepared testimony of Stewart Baker, Att'y, Steptoe & Johnson) (suggesting that
Carnivore "protects the privacy of the crooks, but not the innocent people who are investigated").
229. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1968); see also Kremen v. U.S., 343 U.S. 346 (1957);
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. U.S., 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
230. See Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant
Dir., FBI).
231. See FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Tom Perrine, Principal
investigator, Pacific Inst. for Computer Security).
232. See Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant
Dir., FBI).
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given network is enough to compromise a user's trust that their information
is secure. This will certainly cost the ISP its clients.
Additionally, Carnivore's infinitely broad dragnet exceeds the scope
of the Fourth Amendment because Carnivore wades through material that
even the most lenient ECPA court order would prohibit in the telephone
communications context.233 Tailored to limit the scope of FBI searches, the
ECPA requires, if known, the identity of the person subject to criminal
investigation for a source collection,234 and the identity of the person whose
235communications are to be intercepted for content surveillance. Because
Carnivore will be intercepting and combing through all digital
communications on an ISP, the FBI could just produce a list of all the ISP's
customers to identify the subjects of its search, satisfying the ECPA
identity requirement. Even without such a literal reading of the statute, the
ECPA does not invite such a broad search.236 As the Supreme Court stated,
the Fourth Amendment "was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon
the personal security of our citizenry.' 237 Yet, Carnivore's rapid processing
and broad dragnet capabilities compromise this constitutionally guarded
privacy.
C. Following the Telephone Wiretap Precedent: Letting ISPs Produce the
Surveillance Results Themselves to Protect Their Customers' Fourth
Amendment Right to Privacy
Carnivore creates constitutional problems. However, the internet will
become a safe-haven for criminal conduct. In fact, the FBI may not be the
best entity to effectively regulate the internet because of its slow response
to internet security concerns, lack of adequate resources to monitor
criminal conduct on the internet, 238 and bureaucratic hurdles hampering its
surveillance.239 On the other hand, because of high consumer demand for
internet security, ISPs already have similar sniffers devoted solely to
network maintenance. Given their commercial access to internet security
resources, ISPs have had great success over the last decade securing their
233. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4)(a), 3123(b)(1)(B) (1994).
234. Id. § 3123(b)(1)(B).
235. Id. § 2518(4)(a).
236. FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Barry Steinhardt, Assoc. Dir.,
ACLU).
237. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969). While this case discussed arrests and
investigatory detentions, the Court's statement offers a relevant definition of the Fourth
Amendment's broad role in society. See id.
238. See President's Working Group, supra note 4, at 26.
239. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, 3121-27 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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own systems from criminal conduct by using commercial sniffers that
operate like Carnivore, but without the cumbersome Fourth Amendment
information filters.24 °
Promoting ISP regulation over the internet may not be a perfect
solution reducing internet crime while securing user privacy. 241 Because
federal law gives ISPs broad control over their networks' content, the ISP
may never have an incentive to monitor criminal conduct.242 However, the
FBI should be willing to cooperate with an ISP to develop commercial
sniffers. This would certainly be more productive than compelling ISPs to
consent to the invasive installation of Carnivore's software and hardware
onto its systems and the covert operation of Carnivore from a remote
location.
243
In fact, critics attribute many of Carnivore's problems to this very
hostile and adversarial role that the FBI envisions as its future on the
244internet. To protect telephone companies from excessive government
intrusion on its systems, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA").245  Fearing that a telephone
company would become the government's newest law enforcement branch,
CALEA prohibits the FBI from exploiting telephone services. 246  It
effectively entrusts a phone company to conduct surveillance and produce
247the results, leaving the FBI out of the physical process of wiretapping.
240. See Jeffrey Benner, Nailing the Company Spies, WIRED, March 1, 2001, at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0, 1294,41968,00.html (last visited March 20, 2001) (describing
'Silent Runner,' a commercial network surveillance device that Benner describes as "a
sophisticated information gathering and analysis tool that makes traditional keyword 'sniffers'
obsolete"); see also PR Newswire, supra note 223 (describing the availability of effective, private
internet security resources).
241. See generally Cody, supra note 22.
242. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1994).
243. See FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Robert Corn-Revere, Att'y,
Hogan & Hartson) (discussing the successful cooperation between an ISP and law enforcement in
an e-mail surveillance project).
244. See Ann Harrison, Don't Like Carnivore? How About Altivore?, COMPUTERWORLD,
Sept. 25, 2000, at 12. In her article, Harrison discusses Earthlink's lawsuit against the FBI. Id.
Earthlink, an ISP, feared that Carnivore's installation would affect network stability, and the
judge ruled that Earthlink could create and use its own sniffer for surveillance. Id.
245. See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (1994).
246. Id. § 1004; Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (oral statement of James X. Dempsey, Senior
Staff Counsel, Ctr. for Democracy and Tech.) (stating that "[a] telecommunication service
provider shall design its system so that a wiretap is activated within the switching premises and
controlled by telephone company personnel, not by the law enforcement personnel-precisely
because this committee was concerned about the problem of remote FBI access to the actual guts
of the network of the service provider").
247. See Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (oral statement of James. X. Dempsey, Senior Staff
Counsel, Ctr. for Democracy and Tech.).
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CALEA does not govern the internet. 24 However, considering that the FBI
relies so heavily on an analogy between the telephone and internet when
arguing for surveillance, it is hard to understand why it refuses to follow its
own precedent protocol by allowing ISPs to produce the searches for it.
Because the Fourth Amendment explicitly regulates the government
and not private businesses, 249 a communication providers have the power to
regulate their systems without the same Fourth Amendment encumbrances
that hinder the government.2 Not only do ISPs already use their own
commercial sniffers to maintain their systems, 251 they also have a
fundamental business interest in securing their customers' personal
information from illegitimate third parties, including the government. 52
Effectively, if ISPs were to conduct surveillance for the FBI in the same
manner as the telephone companies, the ISPs could restrict the FBI's broad
access while limiting the FBI's attempts to make ISPs its newest law
enforcement facilities.
The FBI, however, does not share this idealistic vision of harmony
between law enforcement and ISPs. 253 The FBI urges that smaller ISPs do
not have the technical capacity to monitor their systems. 4 Clearly, this
rationale does not address why the FBI wants to compel larger ISPs to
implement Carnivore, even though they are more than capable of
conducting the surveillance on their own. Nevertheless, the FBI asserts
that it designed Carnivore with the "mom and pop" ISPs in mind because
they do not have the financial resources for meeting the FBI's surveillance
needs. 5  Because the FBI needs access to all ISPs, it presents itself as
"willing to bear the technical and cost burden" of installing Carnivore onto
any network.256
The FBI has failed to provide a compelling reason why large ISPs
should open their systems to Carnivore. Despite its resources and lack of
248. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001(8)(C)(i), 1002(b)(2)(A).
249. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment secures privacy from unreasonable
government searches and seizures. Id.
250. See id.
251. See FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Tom Perrine, Principal
investigator, Pacific Inst. for Computer Sec.).
252. King, supra note 221, at 89.
253. Fourth Amendment Issues, supra note 93 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr,
Assistant Dir., FBI) (indicating that the FBI intends to limit the ISP's assistance with Carnivore to
the initial installation).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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Fourth Amendment restraints, 257 the FBI overlooks the fact that even the
smaller ISPs have the resources and technical skills to monitor their own
systems. 8 Even if the smaller ISPs lack sniffer software, the FBI has two
alternatives to hijacking systems. First, the FBI can release Carnivore's
source code. This is unlikely, as the FBI fears that public disclosure of
Carnivore's intricacies will make it more vulnerable to hackers.259
However, releasing the source code to the ISPs ensures that the smaller
ISPs will be capable of searching their own networks. Additionally,
releasing the program's code gives the ISPs a chance to build their own
sniffer systems based on Carnivore but tailored to maintain the security of
their own systems. 260 Even the DOJ technical review team suggested that
the FBI release Carnivore's source code to allow the ISPs to test and use
the program and free themselves from FBI entanglement.26'
While the FBI adamantly refuses to release Carnivore's code,262 it has
the option of providing the ISP with the Carnivore black box for the
duration of the court order, so the ISPs can conduct the searches
themselves. If ISPs use Carnivore to conduct the surveillance themselves,
it is justifiable because ISPs have a business interest in protecting the
privacy of their innocent clients. Additionally, this option requires the FBI
to cooperate with the ISPs and respect their desire to maintain the integrity
of their services and systems.
As a check on the FBI's attempt to watch the whole internet with one
program, it is the ISPs that should conduct internet surveillance at the
request of the FBI, just like the telephone companies conduct the FBI's
257. See id.
258. FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Peter William Sachs, President,
ICONN, LLC). Sachs characterized his own ISP as one the FBI claims is too small to conduct
the searches it needs. Id. He rebutted, "[w]e do have the capability-in fact, any ISP has the
capability of supplying the FBI with exactly what it wants in a more accurate, more efficient and
more private manner, because we have absolutely no need to look at anybody's information,
except for the actual target."
259. Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Dir.,
FBI).
260. FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Tom Perrine, Principal Investigator,
Pacific Inst. for Computer Sec.) (indicating that "if the equivalent of Carnivore were available in
open source, that.., would lower the barriers to entry for the smaller and less technically capable
ISPs to provide this information").
261. ILL. INST. OF TECH., supra note 14, at xv. IITRI's review recommends that the FBI
"[w]ork toward public release of Carnivore source code." Id.
262. Fourth Amendment Issues, supra note 93 (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr,
Assistant Dir., FBI) (stating that the FBI "would have a problem with full open disclosure,
because that, in fact, would allow anyone who chose to develop techniques to spoof what we do
an easy opportunity to figure out how to do that").
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wiretaps. 263 While this solution imposes significant burdens on ISPs,264 it
is infinitely less intrusive than Carnivore's current network-hijacking
protocol. Given the choice, it is a safe assumption that most ISPs would
prefer control of their own systems rather than suffer a takeover by law
enforcement.
D. Abandoning Unacceptable Analogies and Outdated Legislation:
Adopting Internet-Specific Legislation
As both law enforcement and privacy advocates prepare to shape
future internet regulation, lawmakers and the courts must balance law
enforcement's need to police the internet for crime against the public's
expectation of privacy. Current federal statutes do not adequately address
sophisticated technologies. The government needs to abandon deficient
analogies that fail to account for obvious discrepancies between modern
and antique surveillance tools.
The DOJ asserts that criminal surveillance regulations should be
technology-neutral in order to avoid using multiple standards for the same
surveillance.265  However, intemet surveillance vastly differs from
telephone surveillance. Because of this flawed analogy, law enforcement's
ignorance of the inherent technological differences between the internet
and the telephone tramples on the internet user's constitutionally protected
266privacy.
As long as the courts characterize the internet as "'ambient-nowhere
in particular and everywhere at once,"' 267 despite its great prominence in
our lives, it is difficult to predict any course of action. Similar to the
courts, legislators share the onerous task of either manipulating
technologically outdated law or pioneering new law and risking social,
economic and political accountability for unforeseeable failures.268
While it is impossible to expect law to remain current with
technology, it utterly fails when it cannot recognize technological trends
263. See 47 U.S.C. § 1004.
264. FBI's Carnivore, supra note 30 (oral statement of Stewart Baker, Att'y, Steptoe &
Johnson) (remarking that no small ISP wants the role of intercepting content for the government).
265. Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (oral statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy Assistant
Att'y General, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
266. See discussion, supra Part IV.A.
267. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 169 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951,
956 (Ariz. 1998)).
268. See generally Universal Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (providing groundbreaking arguments supporting and opposing the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998).
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and respond quickly enough to secure individuals' constitutional rights.
The lack of new legislation specifically regulating internet surveillance
freezes Fourth Amendment rights, crystallizing them into technologically
inappropriate legislation. Currently, the possibility exists for the FBI and
other law enforcement agencies to simply tweak their search protocol and
adopt less threatening names for their surveillance programs like Echelon
269
or Altivore. 270  As long as surveillance regulations fail to specifically
address the uniqueness of the internet, millions of users will log on as
guinea pigs subject to law enforcement surveillance experiments, with little
recourse to protect their personal privacy other than staying offline.
Lawmakers are a long way from controlling the internet with
balanced legislation. At this juncture, Congress should prioritize internet
legislation and continue the trial and error process integral to new
lawmaking. While internet-specific legislation poses its own pitfalls,27'
even the most controversial internet-specific legislation will guarantee
vigorous dialogue between digital libertarians and control-hungry agencies,
hashing out policies to forge a more evenhanded solution. When
lawmakers insecurely clutch inadequate and outdated standards out of
political timidity, they stifle public advocacy, the very heart of our
democracy.
In general, reliance on outmoded statutes to govern a new electronic
medium imposes constitutional threats. Carnivore's existence confirms
internet users' Orwellian fears, and law enforcement agencies are permitted
to exploit loopholes in current surveillance law until Congress fortifies
Fourth Amendment privacy rights with internet-specific legislation. No
other communications technology retains infinite personal information
through such progressive communications services. Therefore, Congress
needs to disregard the DOJ's plea for technology-neutral legislation and
embark on new surveillance regulations for the internet.
V. CONCLUSION
Carnivore's broad search protocol, coupled with the fact that digital
code over the internet discloses significantly more private information than
a telephone could ever reveal, makes it a threat to Fourth Amendment
269. See Steve Kettmann, U.S. Eyes Europe's Echelon Probe, WIRED, July 6, 2000, at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0, 1283,37411,00.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2000).
270. Harrison, supra note 244.
271. Digital Privacy, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy
Assistant Att'y General, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice) (warning that creating technology-
specific law in substantive and procedural criminal law creates too many standards for
surveillance, raising the bar for the prosecutor).
2001]
514 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:481
privacy rights. Lawmakers need to either shut the program down or
drastically alter its search capabilities. Ultimately, the FBI's struggle to
monitor the internet within its technologically outdated federal guidelines
highlights the internet's need for technology-specific legislation. Until
such legislation exists, lawmakers leave innocent internet users with little
protection, while law enforcement simultaneously makes stronger and less
conspicuous attempts to compromise users' constitutional right to privacy.
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